Nietzsche, Kant, and Synthetic Judgments A Priori
Aphorisms from Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil #9
I would like to continue commenting on aphorisms from Beyond Good and Evil (1886). We continue reading the first chapter of this book: “Prejudices of Philosophers.”
As a reminder, you can find the previous posts on the following page: Nietzsche.
It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he said: “This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics.” Let us only understand this “could be”! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty in man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to discover if possible something — at all events “new faculties” — of which to be still prouder! — But let us reflect for a moment — it is high time to do so. “How are synthetic judgments a priori POSSIBLE?” Kant asks himself — and what is really his answer? “BY MEANS OF A MEANS (faculty)” — but unfortunately not in five words, but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of German profundity and verbal flourishes, that one altogether loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man — for at that time Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the “Politics of hard fact.” Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately into the groves — all seeking for “faculties.” And what did they not find — in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between “finding” and “inventing”! Above all a faculty for the “transcendental”; Schelling christened it, intellectual intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly, in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, however — the world grew older, and the dream vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost — old Kant. “By means of a means (faculty)” — he had said, or at least meant to say. But, is that — an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? “By means of a means (faculty),” namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere,
Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva,
Cujus est natura sensus assoupire.
But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question, “How are synthetic judgments a PRIORI possible?” by another question, “Why is belief in such judgments necessary?” — in effect, it is high time that we should understand that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily — synthetic judgments a priori should not “be possible” at all; we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence belonging to the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the enormous influence which “German philosophy” — I hope you understand its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)? — has exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA had a share in it; thanks to German philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians, and the political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last century into this, in short — “sensus assoupire.”… (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern, The Project Gutenberg, 2003)
Immanuel Kant is probably one of the most famous philosophers of all time. His influence on our field is still important today. In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781; 1787), he proposes to consider the possibility of “synthetic judgement a priori” (synthetischen Urteilen a priori). I am not sure if you are familiar with this expression. It refers to judgments that extend our knowledge and are known by reason independently of experience.
In other words, this concept holds the idea that one can gain knowledge of something without experiencing it. This is the case with causation, for example. When you are confronted with an effect, you naturally assume that there is a cause for that effect. For David Hume, such an inference is a habitual error because we cannot experience the necessary connection between cause and effect itself, but for Kant it is a legitimate inference. If there is an effect, there must be a cause.
In this aphorism, Nietzsche uses sarcasm to discuss Kant’s discovery. This sarcasm criticizes not only Kant, but entire schools of philosophy that were conceived at Kant’s feet. What is the nature of Nietzsche’s criticism? It is a psychological attack. Nietzsche criticizes Kant and his followers for being proud of the first discovery of synthetic judgment a priori.
Why is this such a big deal you might think. It is a great discovery. However, for Nietzsche it is nothing but an unprovable idea.
What Kant has really done is not to solve a problem, but to move it. Kant argues that causality is not an empirical inference, as Hume suggests, but a necessary a priori condition imposed by the human mind to structure experience.
But Nietzsche does not think this is a completely satisfying solution to the problem. As Nietzsche explains, without such beliefs, Kant’s philosophy collapses like a house of cards. Nietzsche criticizes Kant not only for relying on beliefs, but for pretending that these beliefs are necessary truths. No truth has been discovered here either, other than the importance of beliefs in human life and knowledge to make sense of what is happening.
You may be thinking, “Well, Kant’s philosophy may be bullshit. I get it, but who really cares about the accuracy of 18th century philosophy?” Good question. Thank you very much!
It is also a fact that synthetic judgments a priori are not exclusively about causation. For Kant, mathematical truths like “7+5=12” are synthetic a priori because they extend knowledge through the pure intuitions of space and time that underlie all mathematical reasoning. And such an idea has gone far beyond Kant, influencing philosophical debate to the present day.
You are probably thinking, “Okay, Nietzsche doubts the accuracy of Kant’s views. He is nihilistic. Everyone knows that, but we still see things happening causally in everyday life, mathematicians continue to do amazing things that help us enjoy for example online life, and logicians do a pretty good job as well”.
But Nietzsche does not really seek to deny the accuracy of Kant's intuition. He is asking what drives him to have such an intuition. And the problem for me is not really that synthetic judgments require some beliefs in an “a priori,” but that we assume a necessary connection between elements. What if in some phenomena this connection is not necessarily necessary? What if we accept the miracle of non-necessity?
To be continued…
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The mind is a curious thing. Am not at all sure what Kant meant by apriori, but am fairly well convinced that Nietzsche was not a nihilist.
When studying a concept, stoicism, Buddhism, and other thought ideas, what have discovered is that when have thought on a given item for a while, the mind seems to open up, expands, discovers, something like that, a wider view of what had been thinking about. Not sure that would be called apriori, since it began from a previous thought, but it may have been embedded in it, and just took time to unfold. Any thoughts?