Nietzsche on Philosophy’s Hidden Metrics…
Aphorisms from Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil #3
I would like to continue commenting on aphorisms from Beyond Good and Evil (1886). We are at the beginning of the first chapter of his book: “Prejudices of Philosophers.”
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Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious thinking must be counted among the instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of philosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew, as one learned anew about heredity and “innateness.” As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is “being-conscious” OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life. For example, that the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that illusion is less valuable than “truth” such valuations, in spite of their regulative importance for US, might notwithstanding be only superficial valuations, special kinds of niaiserie, such as may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves. Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the “measure of things.” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern, The Project Gutenberg, 2003)
In this aphorism Nietzsche continues his criticism of philosophers. It is not a sterile attack on philosophy, but aims to pave the way for a new kind of philosophy and philosophers.
The reader may well be surprised by the tone that this German thinker adopts towards those he might consider his colleagues. This tone is clearly intended to provoke a shock in the reader, asking him to think twice about what seems obvious.
It is more than just a call to think twice; it is a call to question views that tradition tends to take for granted, but that could be deconstructed and reveal something entirely new. In this sense, Nietzsche’s explicit critique of metaphysics can be seen as anticipating some aspects of what Jacques Derrida later called ‘deconstruction’, a concept that Derrida developed under the influence of Heidegger, who in turn was influenced by Nietzsche.
It is generally admitted that philosophy is the result of the work of reason, the exercise of rationality or logic; a clearly conscious intellectual activity of a high order. Well! Nietzsche thinks quite differently. He judges that what usually constitutes the ground of philosophical thinking is something that is usually considered to be far less scientific: ‘instincts’.
He comes to denounce the unconscious influence of a physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of life (physiologische Forderungen zur Erhaltung einer bestimmten Art von Leben), which is precisely what he means by instinct. In other words, Nietzsche criticizes philosophers for unconsciously basing their evaluations primarily on physiological needs, on instinct.
Why such a criticism? If the goal of philosophy is to elucidate truth, then to be unconsciously guided in this search by our instincts, or by the idea that what would comfort our way of life, is likely to lead to an inaccurate description of what things are, of what truth is.
For Nietzsche, the belief in oppositions of values (as explained in the previous aphorism) is such an inaccurate view to which philosophers are instinctively led.
A proverbial phrase attributed to the Greek philosopher Protagoras states that “Man is the measure of all things” (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος). This phrase captures what is considered as a fundamental aspect of Protagoras' philosophy, in which truth and reality are seen as relative to human perception and experience, implying that all judgments about truth, value, and existence are dependent on human perspective.
However, when we consider theological perspectives, a different principle often emerges: it is not man, but God who should be regarded as “the measure of all things.” In these views, God embodies the ultimate standard, providing an absolute and objective reference for truth and morality.
Nietzsche implicitly suggests in this aphorism that what is the measure of things should be considered, at least at this level of his analysis, an open question. He introduces a nuance of uncertainty or attenuation with “gerade”, leaving the door open to other interpretations.
To be continued…
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Just riffing here, but OF COURSE our thinking has a least some element of our “nature” coming into play {Nietzche calling it instinct}, and that leads us toward maximizing what might comfort us {BUT, through philosophy, we get deep into how and why that would be, and whether what “comforts” is truly the best course, also as part of philosophy}. That element of “instinct” is NOT a bad thing or in any way to be dismissed. To attempt to extricate those aspects from a cogent and valid philosophy speaks to me of something else Neitzche may have left out — Psychopathy. If Neiztche’s brain were available for testing, would we find those tell-tale signs that he lacked the structures that promote the baseline “instincts” toward empathy and relationship? As modern research has demonstrated, not everyone whose brain shows the tells for possible psychopathy develops into a malignant psychopath. Some just develop a lack of caring …
OK, I have nothing to go on here other than what he said, but he speaks as one whose instincts may not have been as much influenced by the social caring and connections and love of others that influence the thik ing of most of the rest of us.
I could be wrong.
I’m curious as to why you don’t cite the Walter Kaufmann translations? With that, I want to say that I appreciate your posts- you’ve given me some nice resources for works in Japanese philosophy. Thanks!