Philosophers’ Testimonies of Themselves

Aphorisms from Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil #5

I would like to continue commenting on aphorisms from Beyond Good and Evil (1886). We continue with the first chapter of his book: “Prejudices of Philosophers.”

As a reminder, you can find the previous posts on the following page: Nietzsche.

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It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of — namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: “What morality do they (or does he) aim at?” Accordingly, I do not believe that an “impulse to knowledge” is the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons and cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate LORD over all the other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to philosophize. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise — “better,” if you will; there there may really be such a thing as an “impulse to knowledge,” some kind of small, independent clock-work, which, when well wound up, works away industriously to that end, WITHOUT the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part therein. The actual “interests” of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction — in the family, perhaps, or in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not CHARACTERISED by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as to WHO HE IS, — that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other. (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern, The Project Gutenberg, 2003)

For those who have read my previous posts on Nietzsche’s aphorisms from Beyond Good and Evil, there is probably nothing really new here. It is more of an explanation of what he means while criticizing previous philosophers. Nietzsche sees himself as a turning point in the history of philosophy. He is not trying to enter that history, but to change its course.

We might accuse him of being driven by his own instinct to do things for which he criticized earlier philosophers. The reader may think: Isn’t Nietzsche driven by his own need to feel recognized in his call for a new kind of philosopher?

That may be true of Nietzsche himself, but shouldn’t philosophy change a little? Does that make that change any less important? Are philosophers aware of their own unique, personal motivations for doing philosophy, for dealing with a particular question, and for being driven to some form of answer?

We can also extend such a question to ourselves: are we, the readers, aware of what drives us to see the world as we do? To have one political opinion and not another? To think about what education should be and what it should not be?

Let’s return to the central question of this aphorism which concerns the philosopher’s claim to objectivity and impartiality. On such a question, the tension between consciousness and unconsciousness is a central theme in Nietzsche’s thought.

Philosophers may not be aware of their own biases, at least not completely, and they need to examine themselves if they really want to be objective and unbiased about what things are and must be.

So what Nietzsche is asking for is self-introspection. Of course, our own instincts, tendencies, feelings, and so on do not necessarily have to disappear. But in order to think clearly, we need to avoid bias as much as possible, and to do that we need to understand what drives us.

This is a pretty basic thing to say. However, it is important for someone who claims to be telling the truth (which is what objectivity and impartiality are all about).

Philosophers have always pretended to speak the truth, but — at least most of the time — without being aware of what determines, influences or supports their own thoughts.

Moreover, Nietzsche considers here that it is above all a philosopher’s attitude which underlies their thought. The morality of an author (i.e., his moral conceptions) determines what a particular author writes, and that it gives indications of who this author is.

To put it another way, a philosopher’s philosophy can be seen as the personification of that philosopher’s beliefs. Beneath the mask that philosophers wear through the language they use or the writing style they choose, there is individuals, their instincts, and their moral views: a testimony (Zeugnis) of who they are, a “confession of its originator” (das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers).

Nietzsche also discusses here the idea that philosophy would be a neutral search for pure knowledge. In his view, it is not knowledge itself that is sought, but instrumental means. We seek knowledge in order to do something. Thus, rationality is not the goal (as some Enlightenment writers thought), but a tool for instrumental means.

To be continued…

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