The Architecture of Trust in Democratic Life
Paul Faulkner and the Challenge of Political Confidence in Modern Democracies #2
In a previous post, I discussed how Paul Faulkner analyzes trust in his 2018 paper, “Finding Trust in Government,” which was published in the Journal of Social Philosophy.
Faulkner presents a philosophical theory of trust and applies it to the political dimension. He distinguishes between the horizontal dimension of citizen-to-citizen trust and the vertical dimension of citizen-to-government trust.
Using this framework, he questions previous perspectives by asserting that not only is trust in the government conceptually feasible, but it is also important for a democratic society.
Horizontal Trust Between Citizens
Faulkner identifies two main types of horizontal trust: particularized and generalized. A particularized trust is defined as trust in specific individuals and situations. Two types of particularized trust can be distinguished:
Predictive trust: This form of trust is based on a belief about how the trusted party will behave, typically grounded in strategic or instrumental reasoning.
Affective trust: This form of trust is based on a normative expectation that the trusted party will be moved by the fact that one relies on them, taking that reliance as a reason to act.
Faulkner argues that mechanisms designed to increase predictive trust — such as transparency standards and sanctions — can unintentionally undermine affective trust by treating individuals as potential deceivers and thereby denying their moral agency.
However, he also emphasizes that predictive and affective trust are mutually reinforcing and can generate a virtuous cycle: institutional design can cultivate predictive trust, which may then support the development of affective trust over time.
Generalized trust among citizens is considered the most basic form of social trust. It is an all-encompassing attitude — “X is trusting” — that does not target specific individuals or actions.
Instead, it reflects a disposition to presume that people generally act in accordance with normative expectations. This attitude presupposes a belief that social interactions are normatively structured and an optimism that others will usually do the “right thing.”
Faulkner argues that such trust is essential for stable democratic cooperation, reduces corruption, increases civic participation, and fosters social cohesion.
Vertical Trust Between Citizens and Government
Regarding vertical trust, Faulkner distinguishes between particularized trust in specific government representatives and generalized trust in government as an institution.
For him, particularized vertical trust in government representatives must be predictive, because affective trust would entail treating officials’ responsiveness to individual reliance as legitimate — which risks leading to corruption. Instead of acting in a second-person, trust-responsive manner, public officials are expected to act in a third-person way, guided by impartial deliberation over public reasons.
In contrast, generalized vertical trust in the government is both possible and desirable. This form of trust is based on the belief — and normative expectation — that government institutions will act responsibly and in accordance with shared civic values.
Faulkner argues that generalized trust in the government should be treated epistemically like belief: it must track evidence about whether the government fulfills its normative obligations and acts in the public’s interest. If governments act irresponsibly through corruption, neglect, or abuse, for example, then generalized trust becomes epistemically unwarranted.
He also emphasizes that generalized trust tends to be higher in societies with universal welfare programs and lower in contexts where corruption is perceived to be high. Therefore, policy interventions should aim to improve institutional performance and preserve the normative grounds on which citizens’ trust rests.
Conclusion
Faulkner’s contribution is twofold. First, he presents a three-part taxonomy of trust — predictive, affective, and generalized — grounded in a philosophical theory of trust’s psychological and metaphysical structure.
Second, he shows how this theory can be applied to politics to address skepticism about trusting the government. His framework reveals that trust is not a single concept, but a set of complex attitudes acting across interpersonal and institutional dimensions.
He suggests that trust can be cultivated if it is properly understood, empirically supported, and institutionally designed, and that it is not necessarily undermined by the scale and impersonality of modern governance.