Nietzsche and the Tartuffery of the Philosophers

Aphorisms from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil #4

I would like to continue commenting on aphorisms from Beyond Good and Evil (1886). We continue with the first chapter of his book: “Prejudices of Philosophers.”

As a reminder, you can find the previous posts on the following page: Nietzsche.

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That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are — how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are, — but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of “inspiration”), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or “suggestion,” which is generally their heart’s desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub “truths,” — and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his “categorical imperative” — makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask — in fact, the “love of HIS wisdom,” to translate the term fairly and squarely — in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene: — how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray! (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern, The Project Gutenberg, 2003)

Here, Nietzsche continues his criticism of philosophers. He accuses them of being dishonest, for example, by pretending that their views result from “the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic” (durch die Selbstentwicklung einer kalten, reinen, göttlich unbekümmerten Dialektik entdeckt).

For Nietzsche, philosophers’ ideas are usually abstract and refined desires. Such an emphasis is a continuation of the criticism he makes in the previous aphorisms, considering that philosophers are driven by their instincts.

He accuses philosophers of being nothing more than lawyers (Advokaten) who defend their case (their opinion) without having the courage to admit it. For Nietzsche, such an attitude is counterproductive.

In this passage, he (respectfully) accuses Kant of intellectual dishonesty, describing his method as a moralistic charade disguised as dialectical rigor. What appears to be objective reasoning is, for Nietzsche, a series of calculated maneuvers to justify predetermined conclusions. The categorical imperative, far from being a discovery of moral truth, is dismissed as a rhetorical trap masking its subjective origins.

Nietzsche also criticizes Spinoza. His focus is on Spinoza’s reliance on mathematical formalism in his philosophical work. He interprets Spinoza’s use of geometric structure as a defensive strategy, suggesting that this formalism is not merely an intellectual choice, but reflects Spinoza’s timidity.

Nietzsche’s primary concern is not simply the artifice of their methods, but the way in which such methods obscure the origins of their ideas and conceal the personal instincts and prejudices that drive them.

Philosophical truth, Nietzsche suggests, cannot be achieved through systems that obscure these motivations. For Nietzsche, such “tartufferies” represent a failure of courage — a refusal to confront the personal, instinctual, and subjective forces that drive thought.

In criticizing the dishonesty of Kant and Spinoza, Nietzsche implicitly calls for a new kind of philosophy: one that acknowledges its rootedness in human nature.

To be continued…

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